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A. Nature of the Case 
The Plaintiff, now ("Appellant Bright"), filed a complaint for personal injury resulting 
from a dog bite. The complaint named the Respondents, Roman and Natalya Maznik, 
("Respondents Maznik" or "Landlord") who rented property to James and Katherine Thomas 
("Tenants") as defendants in the suit. The complaint alleged various theories of liability based 
on negligence per se for violation of a statute, strict liability and common law negligence. 
There is no dispute that Appellant Bright was bitten by a dog owned by Tenants on 
property which Tenants rented from Respondents Maznik. Appellant Bright claims that there 
were material facts in dispute to prove that Landlord knew or should have known of the vicious 
propensities of the dog and therefore, had a duty to warn her. However, there was no evidence 
presented to prove that Landlord had actual or direct knowledge of vicious propensities of the 
dog. Appellant Bright also argues that Landlord violated provisions ofidaho Code§ 25-2805(2), 
which defines a "vicious" dog and provides penalties for harboring a vicious dog. 
Respondents Maznik filed a motion for summary judgment with respect to each of 
Appellant Bright's theories of liability. The District Court analyzed the claims and granted 
summary judgement to Respondents Maznik on each of Appellant Bright's claims of liability. 
Appellant Bright appealed from the District Court's grant of summary judgment. 
It should be noted that the 2016 Idaho Legislature made substantial revisions to the 
statutory scheme applicable to dogs. Idaho Code § 25-2805(2) has been replaced with Idaho 
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§ 10 a dog it new 
definitions of an "[A]t-risk-dog" and a "[D]angerous dog." Idaho Code§ 25-2810(1)(a) and (b). 
The new Idaho Code§ 25-2810(10) reads as follows: 
,A~ny dog that physically attacks, wounds, bites or otherwise injures any person 
who is not trespassing, when such dog is not physically provoked or otherwise 
justified pursuant to subsection (3) of this section or as set forth in section 25-
2808, Idaho Code, subjects either its owner or any person who has accepted 
responsibility as the possessor, harborer or custodian of the dog, or both, to civil 
liability for the injuries caused by the dog. A prior determination that a dog is 
dangerous or at-risk, or subject to any court order imposing restrictions or 
requirements pursuant to the provisions of this section, shall not be a prerequisite 
to civil liability for injuries caused by the dog. 
Respondents Maznik respectfully request that this Court uphold the grant of summary 
judgment by the District Court on all claims of Appellant Bright. 
B. Statement of Facts 
At all times material hereto, Respondents Roman Maznik and Natalya K. Maznik 
("Respondents Maznik" and "Landlord"), were the owners and landlords of real property in 
Nampa, Idaho, where the dog bite incident took place. R. Vol. I, p. 48. Cashflow 
Management, a property management company in Idaho, was the agent of Landlord 
pursuant to a Property Management Agreement signed by Respondents Maznik and Cashflow 
Management. R. Vol. I, p. 48. Trina Neddo ("Agent Neddo") and her husband were the 
owners of Cash Flow Management. 
On or about April 1, 2009, a Residential Lease/Rental Agreement for the Nampa, 
Idaho property was signed by James R. Thomas and Katherine Thomas ("Tenants"). 
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I, 1S a 
Lease/Rental Agreement which pertains to all pets which Tenants would have on the 
property. R. Vol. I, p. 60. 
Tenants OVv'ned tvvo dogs. 
January 21, 2014, was named Murphy ("Murphy the dog"). Murphy was a medium-coated 
German Shepherd which a lot of people mistook for a Belgian Malinois, instead of a 
German Shepherd, according to Tenant Katherine Thomas. R. Vol. I, p. 155. 
Prior to the dog bite incident on January 21, 2014, no complaints had been reported 
to Cashflow Management regarding either of the Tenants' dogs. R. Vol. I, p. 80. Agent 
Neddo of Cashflow Management met the Tenants' dogs when she went by the residence 
once a month to pick up the rental check and she observed no dangerous propensities or 
characteristics about the dogs. No behaviors or characteristics about the Tenants' dogs had 
caused concern for agent Neddo. R. Vol. I, p. 70. In fact, Appellant Bright has presented no 
information regarding any prior attacks by the Tenants' dog Murphy, before the January 21, 
2014, incident. R. Vol. I, p. 80. 
The Landlord did not regulate the size of the Tenants' dogs that could be kept at the 
Nampa rental property. The Pet Agreement did not require information about the size of a 
dog. However, in this situation, the size of the dog ( 40 lbs) was handwritten as part of the 
description of the dog in the Pet Agreement. R. Vol. I, p. 60. Landlord, through its agent, 
Cashflow Management, did investigate, inspect and ask questions and found nothing of 
concern regarding the dogs. R. Vol. I, pp. 70-71. 
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to 
with respect to whether Respondents Maznick knew or should have known of dangerous 
propensities of the dog, is characterized in the following statements made in the "Nature 
of the Case" section of i\.ppellant's Brief: 
"Statements made by both the owners of the dog and the closest neighbor establish 
that the dog was dangerous, intimidating, barked wildly, lunged hard at the neighbor 
on its leash ... " Appellant's Brief, p. 4-5. 
There are no facts in the record to show that the statements made by the Tenant or 
the neighbor about the dog Murphy were ever communicated to the Landlord or its agent, 
Cashflow Management. 
III. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
A. Whether the District Court was Correct in Granting Summary Judgment to 
Defendants (Respondents Maznik); 
B. Whether the District Court was Correct in Finding the Provisions of Idaho 
Code §25-2805(2) to be Ambiguous; 
C. Whether the District Court's Interpretation of Idaho Code §25-2805(2) was 
Correct. 
IV. ARGUMENT & AUTHORITIES 
A. Standard of Review. 
1. Summary Judgment: 
This Court exercises free review over appeals from a district court's grant of summary 
judgment, applying the same standard the district court used in ruling on the motion. Taylor v. 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF - 9 
u,u,,t"'-'' Cnty. 
Fire & Rescue, 148 Idaho 391, 394, 224 P.3d 458, 461 (2008)). Under that standard, summary 
judgment is proper if "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, sho\v that there is no genuine issue as to an)' material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). 11 If there is no genuine issue of 
material fact, only a question of law remains, over which this Court exercises free review." 
Cristo Viene Pentecostal Church v. Paz, 144 Idaho 304, 307, 160 P.3d 743, 746 (2007). 
The party initially bringing the motion has the burden to prove that no genuine issues of 
material fact exist and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Indian Springs LLC v. 
Indian Springs Land Inv., LLC, 147 Idaho 737, 746, 215 P.3d 457, 466 (2009) (citing Cafferty v. 
Dep't of Transp., Div. of Motor Vehicle Servs., 144 Idaho 324, 327, 160 P.3d 763, 766 (2007)). 
After the moving party meets this burden, " the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to show the 
existence of a genuine issue of material fact. 11 Asbury Park, LLC v. Greenbriar Estate 
Homeowners' Ass'n, Inc., 152 Idaho 338, 343-44, 271 P.3d 1194, 1199-1200 (2012) (quoting 
Chandler v. Hayden, 147 Idaho 765, 769, 215 P.3d 485, 489 (2009)). This Court will" construe 
the record in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, drawing all reasonable 
inferences in that party's favor." Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corp., 141 Idaho 233, 238, 108 P.3d 
380, 385 (2005) (citing Thompson v. Pike, 125 Idaho 897, 899, 876 P.2d 595, 597 (1994)). 
However, " the adverse party may not rest upon mere allegations in the pleadings, but must set 
forth by affidavit specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial." Curlee, 148 Idaho at 
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at l Idaho 21 , 
1227 (1994)). 
2. Statutory Review: 
review. Doe v. Boy Scouts of America, 148 Idaho 427, 430, 224 P.3d 494, 497 (2009). When 
construing a statute, the words used must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning, and 
the statute must be construed as a whole." City of Huetter v. Keene, 150 Idaho 13, 15, 244 P.3d 
157, 159 (2010) (quoting Athay v. Stacey, 142 Idaho 360, 365, 128 P.3d 897, 902 (2005)). "If 
the statute is not ambiguous, this Court does not construe it, but simply follows the law as 
written." Harrison v. Binnion, 147 Idaho 645, 649, 214 P.3d 631, 635 (2009) (quoting [264 P.3d 
948] McLean v. Maverik Country Stores, Inc., 142 Idaho 810, 813, 135 P.3d 756, 759 (2006)). 
When a statute is ambiguous, the determination of the meaning of the statute and its 
application is also a matter oflaw over which this Court exercises free review. Kelso Irwin, P.A. 
v. State Insur. Fund, 134 Idaho 130, 134, 997 P.2d 591,595 (2000); JR. Simplot Co. v. Western 
Heritage Ins. Co., 132 Idaho 582,584,977 P.2d 196, 198 (1999). 
B. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THERE WAS NO 
GENUINE ISSUE AS TO ANY MATERIAL FACTS IN DISPUTE WITH 
REGARD TO EACH THEORY OF LIABILITY URGED BY APPELLANT 
IN THIS MATTER. 
1. Evidence in the Record Does Not Support Appellant Bright's 
Argument That Respondents Maznik, Knew or Should Have 
Known that the Dog Was Vicious. 
Appellant Bright sets out a summary of facts, which, she claims, when viewed most 
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to or was 
v1c1ous. Appellant's Brief, p. 13. However, Appellant Bright seems to interchange facts 
with assumption or conclusions. 
Appellant Bright makes a statement that "Mazniks [Landlord] assumed a dutv to 
screen out tenants with dogs of an aggressive breed." Appellant's Brief - p. 13. (emphasis 
added) This is a legal conclusion rather than a statement of fact. Although, it is not clear 
whether Appellant Bright is arguing this issue on appeal, Respondents Maznik will briefly 
review the issue. 
The District Court analyzed Appellant Bright's "assumption of duty" claim in its 
Memorandum Decision. R. Vol. I, pp. 11-13. The District Court determined the 
following: that" ... whether Mazniks had a duty to protect third parties from the Tenants' 
dog depends on whether, they, through their Agent Neddo, did either of two things: (1) 
collected a pet deposit with the intent to protect third parties, and/or (2) whether they 
restricted the type or size of dog Tenants could keep on the property." 
The Idaho Court of Appeals in Boots ex rel. Boots v. Winters, 145 Idaho 389, 179 
P.3d 352 (Ct. App. 2008), addressed similar questions where the injured party asserted the 
landlord assumed a duty to protect third parties. The injured party claimed the landlord 
regulated the type or size of dog permitted on the property and the landlord collected a pet 
deposit, thus, it assumed a duty. The Idaho Appellate Court in Boots, at 396, concluded 
there was no assumption of duty on the part of the landlord. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that it is possible to create a duty where one 
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not one no to 
do so, the duty arises to perform the act in a non-negligent manner. Udy v. CusterCounty, 136 
Idaho 386,389, 34 P.3d 1069, 1072 (2001); Coghlan v. Beta Theta Pi Fraternity, 133 Idaho 388, 
400, 987 P.2d 300, 312 (1999). See also Sharp, 118 Idaho at 300, 796 P.2d at 509. Liability for 
an assumed duty, however, can only come into being to the extent that there is in fact an 
undertaking. Udy, 136 Idaho at 389, 34 P.3d at 1072. See also Bowling v. Jack B. Parson Cos., 
117 Idaho 1030, 1032, 793 P.2d 703, 705 (1990). Although a person can assume a duty to act on 
a particular occasion, the duty is limited to the discrete episode in which the aid is rendered. Udy, 
136 Idaho at 389, 34 P.3d at 1072. 
The District Court, in the instant case, analyzed similar questions. The Pet 
Agreement indicated the Tenant will pay an additional $300 for" ... cleaning, repairs, or 
delinquent rent when the Resident vacates." The District Court, referencing the Boots case, 
supra, concluded" ... the mere act of collecting the pet deposit did not mean that a landlord 
assumed a duty." R. Vol I, p. 247. 
The District Court then discussed whether there was evidence that the Landlord 
regulated the type or size of dog. The District Court reviewed the deposition testimony of 
Agent Neddo, and concluded that" ... there was nothing in her testimony that implies that 
even Pit bulls and Rottweilers were necessarily excluded by Neddo, just that she might pay 
more attention to considering whether these breeds should be allowed. " R. Vol I, p. 248. 
Based on the foregoing, the District Court, in the instant case, correctly found that 
Landlord had not assumed a duty to protect third parties from the Tenants' dog. R. Vol I, 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF - 13 
Appellant Bright also makes the statement that "[a] simple internet search would 
have revealed the aggressive nature of this breed." Appellant's Brief, p. 13. This is not a 
fact but rather an assumption made bJ1 i\ppellant Bright Furthermore, the internet 
reference by Appellant Bright contains no statement that the breed Malinois is aggressive, 
beyond saying the breed is used to "guard the grounds of the White House." R. Vol. I, p. 
174. Obviously, to be used as a guard dog, the animal would need to be specifically trained for 
that purpose. What the internet reference does say is that "[W]ell-raised and trained Malinois are 
usually active, intelligent, friendly, protective, alert and hard-working." R. Vol. I, p. 175. 
Appellant Bright has translated a generalized statement found on an internet web 
page into a statement of fact suggesting that a certain breed of dog which has been used as 
a guard dog is from an aggressive breed. From there, Appellant Bright makes the leap to 
conclude that an aggressive dog is therefore a vicious dog. However, Appellant Bright has 
failed to assert any facts which provide direct evidence that the dog in the instant case had 
bitten or attacked any person in the past. 
Appellant Bright refers to an affidavit from a neighbor of the Tenant dog owner, 
who described being outside one day when the dog was out with the owner. The neighbor 
claims that the dog lunged and barked at her, while on a leash, so the neighbor 
characterized the dog as vicious. R. Vol. 1, pp. 106-107. However, a neighbor 
characterizing the dog as vicious does not make the dog vicious in the legal sense in the 
absence of any evidence of bites or physical attacks. And more importantly, there is no 
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were aware 
by the Tenant's neighbor. 
With respect to Appellant Brights's claim that Landlord, through their agent, knew 
or should ha·ve knovvrn of the ·vicious tendencies of the Tennant's dog, there is no evidence 
in the record to support these contentions. Therefore, summary judgment as a matter of 
law, was correct on any theory of liability requiring proof that Respondents Maznik knew 
or should have known of the vicious tendencies of the Tenant's dog. 
2. The District Court Was Not in Error in Finding That the Dog 
Did Not Fit the Definition of a Vicious Dog at the Time of the 
Incident as Set Forth in Idaho Code §25-2805(2) 
Appellant Bright argues that Landlord is subject to liability for negligence per se due 
to a violation of LC. § 25-2807(2). The statute states in pertinent part: 
Any dog which, when not physically provoked, physically attacks, wounds, 
bites or otherwise injures any person who is not trespassing, is vicious. It shall 
be unlawful for the owner or for the owner of premises on which a vicious dog 
is present to harbor a vicious dog outside a secure enclosure. A secure enclosure 
is one from which the animal cannot escape and for which exit and entry is 
controlled by the owner of the premises or owner of the animal. LC. § 25-
2807(2) 
Each party in this action interpreted LC. § 25-2807(2) in a different way. The District 
Court found the different interpretations to be reasonable and therefore acted within the bounds 
of its discretion to interpret the statute. 
The interpretation of a statute is an issue of law over which this Court exercises free 
review. Dyet v. McKinley, 139 Idaho 526, 528, 81 P.3d 1236, 1238 (2003). When a statute is 
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statute a matter 
law over which this Court exercises free review. Kelso Irwin, v. State Insur. Fund, 134 
Idaho 130, 134, 997 P.2d 591, 595 (2000); JR. Simplot Co. v. Western Heritage Ins. Co., 132 
Idaho 582, 584, 977 P.2d 196, 198 (1999). 
The District Court analyzed the reasonableness, public policy and legislative history of 
the statute. L & W Supply Corp. v. Chart/and Family Trust, 136 Idaho 738, 743, 40 P.3d 96, 
101 (2002). The District court reviewed the recent case of James v. City of Boise, 2016 Isa. 
LEXIS 83, 376 P.3d 33 (Idaho2016) and concluded that the James case supported the 
Respondents Maznik's argument that "every dog gets one free bite ... "under the statute. 
The District Court then reviewed the legislative history of LC. § 25-2805(2) and 
concluded that the ". . . legislature seemed to recognize viciousness as a condition precedent to 
liability, as did the Mazniks." The District Court also analyzed a similar statute and case law 
from the State of Washington and other jurisdictions and stated: 
Interestingly, the State of Washington imposes liability on a dog owner regardless 
of the former viciousness of the dog RCWA 16.08.040. Importantly, the 
Washington statute imposes liability on dog owners, not the premises' owner. 
See Frobig v. Gordon, 124 Wash.2d 732 (1994); Deane-Gordly v. Willett, 
162 Wash.App. 1029 (2011). Washington Courts have recognized important 
policy reasons for imposing liability on animal owners, but not on premise owners 
- "[ o ]ur rule ... promotes the salutary policy in placing responsibility where it 
belongs, rather than fostering a search for a defendant whose affluence is 
more apparent than his culpability." Clemmons v. Fidler, 58 Wash.App. 32, 38 
(1990). 
In contrast, our legislature amended LC. §25-2805(2) in 1998 making it unlawful 
for the owner or for the owner of premises to keep a vicious dog outside a 
secure enclosure. 
Our legislature could have drafted a statute similar to Washington and have 
imposed liability regardless of the former viciousness of the dog-but it did 
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states liability 
dog fail to liability to landlords. 
(Washington); Cal. Civ. Code§ 3342 (California); MCA 27-1- 715 (Montana). 
After its analysis, the District Court correctly concluded that "[t]here is no evidence in 
the record that Murphy the dog has physically attacked or otherwise bitten anyone prior to the 
current incident. Given this Court's reading of LC. § 25-2805(2), the holding in the James case, 
and the legislative history set forth above, this Court finds the Mazniks are entitled to judgment 
as a matter oflaw on Bright's negligence per se claim." 
Interpreting the statute in the way urged by Appellant Bright would likely lead to an 
unreasonable or absurd result. " ... [C]ourts should refrain from skewing the statute in a way that 
would lead to absurd or unreasonably harsh results." Jasso v. Camas County 151 Idaho 790, 798, 
264 P.3d 897, 905 (2011). 
According to LC. § 25-2805(2), there are certain prerequisites which must first be met in 
order for a dog to qualify under the definition of a vicious dog. These prerequisites require a 
physical attack, wound, bite or other injury to a person who is not trespassing and who has not 
physically provoked the dog. Prior to a physical attack, a wound, a bite or other injury, the dog 
is not deemed vicious under the statute and no duty arises on the part of the owner or owner of 
property to harbor the dog in a secure enclosure. 
Under Appellant Bright's interpretation of the statute, all dog owners would need to keep 
their dog in a secure enclosure at all times, unless on a chain, because the owner would not know 
beforehand whether or when the dog might attack, bite or injure a person. If this is what the 
legislature intended, then they could easily have written the statute to require all dogs to be 
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a secure or a at easily 
have enacted a statute of strict liability which says that the owner of a dog which attacks, bites or 
otherwise injures a person is liable for any damages caused to the person period, with no 
Instead, the Idaho Legislature enacted a statute which requires the prerequisites discussed 
above, before a legal duty attaches to the owner to keep the dog in a secure enclosure or on a 
chain. Prior to the happening of one or more of the prerequisites, there is no duty and no liability 
under the statute. 
The Idaho Supreme Court recently affirmed the rule under common law that all dogs, 
regardless of breed or size, are presumed to be harmless domestic animals. Boswell v. Steele, 
348 P.3d 497 (Idaho App. 2015), quoting Braese v. Stinker Stores, Inc., 157 Idaho 443,337 P.3d 
602 (2014). 
Following the reasoning of Braese, the dog Murphy was presumed to be a "harmless 
domestic animal" at all times prior and up to the very moment it bit Appellant Bright on January 
21, 2014. Once the dog attacked Appellant Bright, it then became "vicious" under the statutory 
defmition. Therefore, Appellant Bright's continual assertions found throughout Appellant's 
Brief that Murphy was a "vicious dog" are unwarranted. 
Another argument in support of the District Court's fmding that the LC. § 25-2807(2) 
does not apply to the dog Murphy under the facts of this case is that Appellant Bright was a 
"trespasser," in the legal sense, on the premises of the Landowner. The statute clearly states: 
"Any dog which, when not physically provoked, physically attacks, wounds, bites or otherwise 
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who is not trespassing, is " 
The Idaho Courts have repeatedly established the difference between the various classes 
of people who enter upon the land of another and the duty owed to such people. The duty of a 
landowner to the person injured on the land turns on the status of the injured person. Holzheimer 
v. Johannesen, 125 Idaho 397, 399, 871 P.2d 814, 816 (1994). The status of the person injured 
on the land is divided into three categories: invitee, licensee, or trespasser. "An invitee is one 
who enters upon the premises of another for a purpose connected with the business conducted on 
the land, or where it can reasonably be said that the visit may confer a business, commercial, 
monetary or other tangible benefit to the landowner." Id. at 400, 871 P.2d at 817. A landowner's 
duty to an invitee is to warn of hidden or concealed dangers and to keep the land in a reasonably 
safe condition. Id. A licensee is a visitor who goes upon the premises of another with the consent 
of the landowner in pursuit of the visitor's purpose. Id.; Evans v. Park, 112 Idaho 400, 401, 732 
P.2d 369, 370 (Ct. App. 1987). Likewise, a social guest is also a licensee. Holzheimer, 125 Idaho 
at 400, 871 P.2d at 817. The duty owed to a licensee is narrow. A landowner is only required to 
share with the licensee knowledge of dangerous conditions or activities on the land. Evans, 112 
Idaho at 401, 732 P.2d at 370. A trespasser is anyone who goes onto the land without 
permission, invitation or lawful authority. Bicandi v. Boise Payette Lumber Co., 55 Idaho 543, 
552, 44 P.2d 1103, 1106 (1935); see also, Lindquist v. Albertsons, Inc., 113 Idaho 830, 831, 748 
P.2d 414, 415 (Ct.App.1987). A landowner's duty to a trespasser is to refrain from willful or 
wanton acts which might cause injury. Huyck v. Hecla Mining Co., 101 Idaho 299, 301, 612 P.2d 
142, 144 (1980). (emphasis added) 
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states an was a to 
determine why Thomas [the Tenant] was behind on vehicle payments and determining whether 
the vehicle should be repossessed." R. Vol. I, p. 139. Appellant Bright was not an "invitee" 
because she \\'as not on the real propelt'f O\\'ned by the Landlord, to "confer a busi11ess, 
commercial, monetary, or other tangible benefit to the landowner." Appellant Bright was not a 
licensee because there is no evidence that she came upon the premises of the Landlord with the 
consent of the Landlord in pursuit of her own purpose. Appellant Bright did not have the 
consent of the Landlord or the Tenants to come upon the property. This was obviously not a 
social visit and Appellant Bright was not a "social guest" of the Tenants. 
According to BARRONS LAW DICTIONARY 500 (3d ed. 1991) citing Restatement 
(Second) Torts § 329, A "trespasser" is one who enters or remains upon land of another 
without the owner's permission. There is no evidence or testimony that Appellant Bright 
asked permission from the Landlord or the Tenants to come upon the property for any 
purpose, even to speak to the Tenants. 
There is no genuine issue of material fact that proves Appellant Bright to be 
anything but a "trespasser" on January 21, 2014, when she stepped onto the real property 
owned by the Landlord to speak to the Tenant about his late vehicle payments. Even if 
the District Court would have interpreted LC.§ 25-2805(2), as argued by Appellant Bright, 
to find that Murphy the dog was "vicious" because he bit her, the fact that she was a 
trespasser would nullify her claim under the statute. Furthermore, there is no evidence 
from any source that the Landlord committed any kind of a "willful" or "wanton" act to 
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was correct 
judgment for Respondents Maznik on this issue. 
3. The District Court Did Not Error in Holding That Idaho Code 
§2'"'-?RO"(?) w~s A mhiguon'-. 
Appellant Bright argues that the District Court determined LC. § 25-2805(2) was 
ambiguous because the parties proposed differing interpretations of the statute. Appellant 
Bright's characterization of the District Court's determination is not complete. What the District 
Court said was, "After listening to arguments of both sides in this case, this Court finds there are 
two reasonable ways to read the statute as set forth above. Thus, there is an ambiguity." R. Vol, 
1, p. 240. (emphasis added) 
Not only did the District Court find "differing interpretations" of the statute as suggested 
by Bright, but it also found each party's interpretation provided a reasonable way to read the 
statute. The key is not that each party presented a differing interpretation but rather that each 
party provided a reasonable way to read the same statute, thus making the statute ambiguous. A 
statute is ambiguous when the meaning is so doubtful or obscure that "reasonable minds might 
be uncertain or disagree as to its meaning." Hickman v. Lunden, 78 Idaho 191, 195, 300 P.2d818, 
819 (1956). 
The statute might seem clear on the initial reading. Any dog which bites is a vicious dog 
and the owner is subject to civil liability and a criminal penalty. However, upon closer 
examination, many questions arise. For example, when does the owner become liable or when 
does the owner have a duty to keep the dog in a secure enclosure? Is it before or after the first 
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answer an owner was to 
bite and how would the owner know he had a duty to keep the dog in a secure enclosure before 
the bite? Or, in other words, if the owner was doing something he was legally permitted to do 
immediately before the bite, how can the owner then instantly at the time of the bite, become 
subject to both civil and criminal penalties at the time of the bite? If Appellant Bright's 
interpretation is correct, then the owner owes a duty for something she/he may not have been 
aware of. With the inclusion of a criminal penalty in the statute, does this not arguably create an 
"ex post facto" law which is prohibited by both the US Constitution and the Idaho Constitution? 
These and other conflicting questions could reasonably be raised by a reading of LC. § 25-
2805(2). 
The District Court correctly found there were two reasonable ways to read the statute, 
therefore the statute was ambiguous as a matter of law. "A statute is ambiguous where the 
language is capable of more than one reasonable construction." Porter v. Board of Trustees, 
Preston School Dist. No. 201, 141 Idaho 11, 14, 105 P.3d 671,674 (2004). 
4. Neither the Dog Owner or the Property Owner were Required to 
To Provide a Secure Enclosure for the Dog at the Time of the Incident 
Appellant Bright seeks to impose liability on Respondents Maznik as the Landlord 
under the provisions of LC. 25-2805(2), for failure to ensure that the dog Murphy was kept in 
a secure enclosure on the property leased by Tenants. Respondents Maznik submit that the 
District Court was correct in finding LC. 25-2805(2) ambiguous and in interpreting the statute to 
mean that before a dog bites once, it is not a vicious dog. The District Court correctly 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF- 22 
anyone prior to the current incident. Therefore, under the statute, neither the dog owner or the 
Landlord had a duty to keep the dog in a secure enclosure prior to a physical attack or bite by 
the rloo-
____ --c,· 
Appellant Bright argues that there are disputed facts on this issue and that these facts 
should have been presented to a jury. The Idaho Court of Appeals in Boswell, p. 509, 
referring to LC. 25-2805(2) held that ... "Whether the dog was vicious and whether it was 
properly confined in a secure enclosure, as contemplated by the statute, are questions for the 
jury." This statement, on its face, seems to support Appellant Bright's contention and 
automatically deny the opportunity to argue at summary judgment the provisions of LC. § 25-
2805(2). 
However, the Boswell case is factually distinguished from the instant case. In 
Boswell, the dog in question had two (2) prior instances where it had bitten other people and 
there was a dispute as to whether these were actual bites or nips. Therefore, it was 
appropriate for the jury to determine whether the dog was "vicious" based upon these prior 
bites. There was also a question whether the gate in the kitchen was a secure enough 
enclosure to properly harbor the dog. Also at issue in Boswell was whether the dog had been 
provoked by the injured party when he stuck his fist into the dog's enclosure. The question 
of what constituted provocation is not at issue in the present case. The Boswell case also did 
not involve a landlord tenant relationship, as far as we know, and the property owner and dog 
owner lived on the same premises with the dog. 
Based upon the facts presented in the instant case, the dog Murphy became "vicious" 
at the time of the first attack on January 21, 2014, but not before. After the first attack, it 
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was 
statute and whether the dog was properly confined in a secure enclosure to a jury. However, 
for purposes of this action it is premature to ask these questions because the dog Murphy was 
Appellant Bright argues that both the Landlord and dog owner are liable under LC. 
§ 25-2805(2). With respect to this argument, the statute reads, " ... It shall be unlawful 
for the owner or for the owner of premises on which a vicious dog is present to harbor a 
vicious dog outside a secure enclosure ... " This is yet another example of the ambiguity 
of the statute. The legislature could have said "the owner and the owner of premises" 
instead of using the word "or." (emphasis added) This would have more clearly 
imposed liability on both. However, by using the word "or" we are left to question, if it 
means one or the other or both. 
A reasonable interpretation of the statute would be that the duty is upon the dog 
owner unless the dog owner does not live on the property where the dog is kept, and in 
that situation, the duty transfers to the owner of the property on which the dog is kept, 
such as a kennel owner. Therefore, in the instant case, the duty would fall on the dog 
owner who lived on the premises rather than on the landlord who was the property owner. 
However, as stated above, there is no need to get to this issue, based upon the District 
Court's finding that the dog was not vicious under the statute. 
The issue of negligence per se which Appellant Bright seeks to impose on the 
Respondents Maznik was recently analyzed by Judge Scott of the Fourth Judicial 
District in his Memorandum Decision and Order on Summary Judgment in Pendery v. 
Camara et al., Ada County Case No. CV PI 1419270 R. Vol. I, p. 225. While not a 
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the and 
case and Judge Scott's analysis is instructive on the issue of "harboring a vicious dog." R. I 
230-232. 
In the Pendery Decision, Judge Scott addressed the same issue that we find in the 
instant case as it pertains to negligence per se for a supposed failure by the landlords to 
harbor a "vicious" dog in a secure enclosure. R. Vol. I, pp. 230-232. 
Section 25-2805(2) criminalizes "harbor[ing] a vicious dog outside a secure 
enclosure" if the harboring is done by either the dog's owner or the owner of 
premises on which the dog is present. LC. § 28-2805(2). To violate the statute, 
the dog's owner or the owner of the premises, as the case may be, must engage 
in conduct that constitutes harboring. The term "harbor" is not defined in the 
statute. That term therefore must he given its plain, usual, and ordinary 
meaning. E.g., Arnold v. City of Stanley, 158 Idaho 218,345 P.3d 1008, 1011 
(2015). It is appropriate to consult a dictionary to discern that meaning. E.g, id. 
The verb form of "harbor" is at issue here. One meaning the Merriam-Webster 
online dictionary ascribes to the verb form of "harbor" is "to hold or contain 
(something)." http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/harbor (last visited 
June 1, 2015). Of the various meanings, the Court considers that one most apt 
here. The question at hand, then, is whether there is evidence in the record that 
Apex and Camara [property owners] "harbor[ ed]--i.e., held or contained 
Read's dog outside a secure enclosure. 
The answer to that question is, in short, that there is no such evidence. The 
record contains no evidence that Apex and Camara caused the dog to be, 
permitted the dog to be, or even knew the dog was outside a secured 
enclosure on the premises rented to Read's husband. Although Apex and 
Camara permitted dogs on the premises, they did not grant permission to let 
the dogs run loose. To the contrary, the Pet Addendum to the Lease 
Agreement sensibly required that the dogs be "on a leash or otherwise under 
Resident's control, and not left unattended when [they are] outside the 
Residence." (Pet Addendum § 5.) Because there is no evidence of any act or 
omission by Apex and Camara that could be considered "harbor[ing]-i.e., 
holding or containing-the dog outside a secure enclosure, Pendery has 
failed to identify a genuine factual dispute about whether Apex and Camara 
violated section 25-2805(2). They did not violate it. In the absence of a 
violation, there is no basis for Pendery's " negligence per se" claim. Apex 
and Camara are entitled to judgment as a matter of law against that claim. 
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caused the dog Murphy to be outside a secure enclosure or even knew the dog was outside a 
secure enclosure on the premises rented to the Tenants who owned the dog. 
Further, the Pet Agreement makes the "Resident" (here, Tenants) responsibie to: 1) 
Keep the pet under control at all times and; 2) Keep the pet restrained, but not tethered, when 
it is outside the Resident's dwelling. R. Vol. I, p. 60. Although the Landlord, in the instant 
case, permitted dogs on the premises, Landlord did not grant permission to let the dogs run 
loose. Landlord required that the dogs be kept under control at all times and restrained when 
they were outside the residence. There is no evidence that Landlord did anything that could 
be considered "harboring" the dog Murphy outside a secure enclosure. 
Appellant Bright has failed to show that Respondents Maznik owed a duty to 
Appellant Bright under LC. § 25-2805(2) to harbor the dog Murphy in a secure enclosure 
before the January 21, 2014, attack. There is no genuine issue of material fact that 
Respondents Maznik violated § 25-2805(2) in any way and the District Court was correct in 
rendering summary judgment. 
5. The Case of Boswell v. Steele Does Not Distinguish the Holding in 
Boots v. Winters with Respect to the Accountability of an Owner 
for an Unprovoked Dog Attack Based Upon the Theory of Premises 
Liability. However, Even if it Did Distinguish the Holding, the Result 
Would be the Same in the Instant Case. 
Appellant Bright argues that the Idaho Court of Appeals in Boswell, distinguished its 
holding in Boots, with respect to a claim based upon premises liability and therefore, the District 
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was 
Appellant Bright is correct that there is a distinction between the cases, but the distinction 
is not in the holding but rather the facts. In Boots, the Idaho Court of Appeals was analyzing a 
fact situation similar to the instant case, where the landlord rented property tu a tenant who 
owned a dog which was involved in a dog bite incident on the rented property. However, the 
landlord did not reside on the premises and did not have knowledge of dangerous propensities of 
the dog. The claimant in Boots, argued that the landlord had a duty to maintain the premises in a 
safe condition and the dog was a condition on the premises which rendered the premises unsafe. 
Based on these facts, the Boots' Court concluded that having the dog on the property was not a 
condition of the property but rather an activity on the land, and under a theory of premises 
liability, the landlord had no duty to protect third parties from activities taking place on the 
rented property which did not implicate the physical condition of the property. Boots, p. 397. 
In the Boswell case, the Idaho Court of Appeals was analyzing a different fact situation 
where there was no evidence of a landlord tenant relationship. In Boswell, A granddaughter 
lived with her grandmother in a house owned by the grandmother. The grandmother and 
granddaughter each owned a dog which they kept at the house owned by the grandmother. The 
granddaughter's dog bit a son-in-law of the grandmother while he was on the property. The 
Court was not dealing with a landlord tenant type relationship but rather a situation where the 
property owner lived on the same property with the dog which bit. Also present in the Boswell 
case were disputed issues of fact as to whether two previous bites, which the granddaughter 
referred to as nips, were sufficient to put the owner on notice of dangerous propensities of the 
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was was secure or not was 
provoked. 
The Boswell Court determined, under the theory of premises liability, that the injured 
son-in-law was a social guest on the property and that the landowner owed a duty to warn the 
social guest of a "known dangerous dog." Boswell, p. 506. The Boswell Court then concluded 
there were issues of fact with respect to whether the landowner failed to warn the injured party of 
a dangerous dog, so the district court erred when it granted summary judgment. 
The Boswell Court did not specifically or expressly distinguish or overrule the Boots 
holding. Rather, it found a different duty owed by the dog owner to the injured party, based 
upon the unique circumstances of the case. The District Court in the instant case, correctly 
relied on the holding in Boots, with respect to Appellant Bright's premises liability claim, 
because the circumstances involving a landlord tenant relationship were similar to the Boots 
case. 
Regardless of whether the Boswell case distinguished the holding in the Boots case, the 
final result would be the same. Relying on Boots, the District Court found a tenant's keeping a 
dog on the landlord's rented premises constituted an activity taking place on the rented property 
and the landlord owed no duty, under a theory of premises liability, to protect third parties from a 
tenant's dog. Under this ruling, the Landlord, in the instant case, owed no duty to Appellant 
Bright. 
If the District Court had applied the holding in Boswell, with respect to premises liability, 
then the Landlord would have had a duty to warn Appellant Bright only of a "known dangerous 
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that there was no evidence in the record that Landlord knew or should have known of the 
dangerous propensities of the dog, prior to the dog bite. Therefore, the result would have been 
the same whether the District Court relied on the holding in Boots or Boswell, with respect to 
Appellant Bright's claim based on premises liability. 
In addition, both the Boswell and Boots Courts acknowledged that the duty owed by the 
owner or possessor of land, under a claim for premises liability, depended on the status of the 
person injured on the land, i.e., whether the person was an invitee, licensee or trespasser. 
Appellant Bright was a trespasser on the land because she had no permission to be there and was 
not there for any business related to the landowner. (Please refer to Respondents Maznik's prior 
discussion on the status of a trespasser) Respondent's Brief, p. 19-20) The only duty owed to a 
trespasser, is to refrain from wanton or willful acts that cause injury. Appellant Bright presented 
no evidence that Landlord engaged in "wanton or willful" acts to injure her. 
Even if the legal status of Appellant Bright on the property of the Landlord was 
considered to be that of a licensee or social guest, as was the situation in the Boswell case, the 
Landlord would then only owe a duty to warn Appellant Bright of known dangerous conditions 
or activities on the land. As previously stated, the District Court found there were no issues of 
material fact that Landlord knew or should have known that Murphy the dog had dangerous 
propensities. Therefore, there was no duty to warn Appellant Bright under this theory of 
premises liability. 
Although the District Court may have relied on the authority of Boots, to reach its 
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outcome correct were no of to 
support Appellant Bright's claim for premises liability and summary judgment was appropriate 
on this issue. 
6. The District Court Was Correct in Finding There Were No Issues 
Of Material Fact With Respect to Evidence of the Vicious Propensities 
of the Dog and Summary Judgment Was Appropriate on This Issue. 
One of Appellant Bright's initial theories of liability was a claim for strict liability. 
Relying on the Boswell case, the District Court, in the instant case, correctly interpreted 
Appellant Bright's claim to be one of liability for domestic animals rather than a strict liability 
claim as urged by Appellant Bright. The Boswell Court indicated that, when responding to a 
claim for strict liability, it was not necessary to adopt the strict liability label. Instead, the Court 
reaffirmed the long standing rule established in McClain v. Lewiston Interstate Fair & Racing 
Ass'n, 17 Idaho 63, 104 P. 1015 (1909), which provides " ... the Idaho Supreme Court has 
adopted a rule that an owner of a domesticated animal will be liable for injuries it causes if the 
owner had prior knowledge, or should have known, of the animal's dangerous propensity. It is 
the elements of the action that are significant, not the label of strict liability or negligence." 
Boswell, p. 505. "In cases where a domestic animal is not trespassing, the owner of the animal 
is liable for injuries caused if the owner knew or should have known of the animal's vicious or 
dangerous tendencies. Boswell, p. 505, quoting from McClain, Id. 
In its analysis in the instant case, the District Court determined that the duty of an owner 
of an animal extended to a store owner in the case of Braese v. · Stinker Stores, Inc., 157 Idaho 
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the Braese case, a was store owner and 
jumped up on a customer causing injury. The Court in Braese stated: 
In the absence of a statute to the contrary, an owner is liable for injuries caused by 
a domesticated animal where the owner knew or should have known of the 
animal's vicious or dangerous propensity." Braese, 157 Idaho at 446, 337 P.3d at 
605 (quoting 4 Am.Jur.2d Animals§ 67). Therefore, ff [a] store owner would also 
have a duty to protect its patrons from a dog that the store owner knew or should 
have known was vicious or had a dangerous propensity. ff 
However, the Court in Braese found no evidence that either the store manager or the store 
cashier knew or should have known that the dog was likely to jump up on customers and 
therefore the store had no duty to protect customers from the dog. 
The District Court also determined that the facts of the instant case were more like 
Braese than Boswell, so the issue was whether the Landlord, in the instant case, knew or should 
have known that the dog Murphy had dangerous propensities. There is no direct evidence that 
the Landlord knew or should have known the dog Murphy was vicious. 
Appellant Bright attempted to prove knowledge on the part of the Landlord by offering 
indirect evidence that the Tenant dog owners knew of dangerous propensities since the dog 
owner believed the dog to be intimidating. R. Vol. I, pp. 154-155. However, being intimidating 
does not equate to the dog having vicious tendencies. Furthermore, it was the Tenant dog owner 
who believed this and not the Landlord or its agent. 
A neighbor, in an affidavit, characterized the dog as vicious, due to barking and lunging. 
R. Vol. I, pp. 106-107. However, there was no evidence of the dog biting or attacking anyone. 
And again, no evidence that the Landlord or its agent knew of this. Lastly, Appellant claimed 
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being vicious or having vicious propensities and there is no evidence that the Landlord or its 
agent, Cashflow Management, knew of the Tenant's statement that the dog was not friendly. 
Based on this, the District Court was correct in finding there were no genuine issues of 
material fact to show that the Landlord or its agent knew or should have known of vicious 
propensities of the dog. Therefore, summary judgment on this issue was proper. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The District Court reviewed and analyzed each of Appellant Bright's theories of liability 
for the dog bite. After doing so, the District Court correctly concluded that there were no 
genuine issues of material fact on any claim urged by Appellant Bright. The District Court also 
correctly found Idaho Code § 25-2805(2) was ambiguous and that a correct interpretation of the 
law, when applied to the facts of the instant case, led to the conclusion that the dog Murphy did 
not fit the definition of a "vicious" dog at the time of the bite in question. 
Based on the foregoing, Respondents Maznik respectfully ask this Court to uphold the 
District Court's grant of summary judgment on all issues. 
Dated this 22nd day of November, 2016. 
MONTGOMERY LAW OFFICES 
By___lo..J..~~~~hf§.-===,.-----
Gary L. o 
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owner was not not to 
being vicious or having vicious propensities and there is no evidence that the Landlord or its 
agent, Cashflow Management, knew of the Tenant's statement that the dog was not friendly. 
Based on this, the District Court \Vas correct in finding there vvere no genuine issues of 
material fact to show that the Landlord or its agent knew or should have known of vicious 
propensities of the dog. Therefore, summary judgment on this issue was proper. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The District Court reviewed and analyzed each of Appellant Bright's theories of liability 
for the dog bite. After doing so, the District Court correctly concluded that there were no 
genuine issues of material fact on any claim urged by Appellant Bright. The District Court also 
correctly found Idaho Code § 25-2805(2) was ambiguous and that a correct interpretation of the 
law, when applied to the facts of the instant case, led to the conclusion that the dog Murphy did 
not fit the definition of a "vicious" dog at the time of the bite in question. 
Based on the foregoing, Respondents Maznik respectfully ask this Court to uphold the 
District Court's grant of summary judgment on all issues. 
Dated this 22nd day of November, 2016. 
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